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Abstract
The (ultra-)dense deployment of small-cell base stations (SBSs) endowed with cloud-like computing
functionalities paves the way for pervasive mobile edge computing (MEC), enabling ultra-low latency
and location-awareness for a variety of emerging mobile applications and the Internet of Things. To
handle spatially uneven computation workloads in the network, cooperation among SBSs via workload
peer offloading is essential to avoid large computation latency at overloaded SBSs and provide high
quality of service to end users. However, performing effective peer offloading faces many unique
challenges due to limited energy resources committed by self-interested SBS owners, uncertainties in
the system dynamics and co-provisioning of radio access and computing services. This paper develops
a novel online SBS peer offloading framework, called OPEN, by leveraging the Lyapunov technique, in
order to maximize the long-term system performance while keeping the energy consumption of SBSs
below individual long-term constraints. OPEN works online without requiring information about future
system dynamics, yet provides provably near-optimal performance compared to the oracle solution
that has the complete future information. In addition, this paper formulates a peer offloading game
among SBSs, analyzes its equilibrium and efficiency loss in terms of the price of anarchy to thoroughly
understand SBSs’ strategic behaviors, thereby enabling decentralized and autonomous peer offloading
decision making. Extensive simulations are carried out and show that peer offloading among SBSs
dramatically improves the edge computing performance.
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lx.chen@miami.edu, jiexu@miami.edu. S. Zhou is with the Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, China.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive mobile devices and the Internet of Things are driving the development of many new
applications, turning data and information into actions that create new capabilities, richer experi-
ences and unprecedented economic opportunities. Although cloud computing enables convenient
access to a centralized pool of configurable and powerful computing resources, it often cannot
meet the stringent requirements of latency-sensitive applications due to the often unpredictable
network latency and expensive bandwidth [1]–[3]. The growing amount of distributed data
further makes it impractical or resource-prohibitive to transport all the data over today’s already-
congested backbone networks to the remote cloud [4]. As a remedy to these limitations, mobile
edge computing (MEC) [1]–[3] has recently emerged as a new computing paradigm to enable
in-situ data processing at the network edge, in close proximity to mobile devices and connected
things. Located often just one wireless hop away from the data source, edge computing provides a
low-latency offloading infrastructure, and an optimal site for aggregating, analyzing and distilling
bandwidth-hungry data from end devices.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of SBS peer offloading.
Considered as a key enabler of MEC, small-cell base stations (SBSs), such as femtocells
and picocells, endowed with cloud-like computing and storage capabilities can serve end users’
computation requests as a substitute of the cloud [3]. Nonetheless, compared to mega-scale
data centers, SBSs are limited in their computing resources. Since the computation workload
arrivals in small cell networks can be highly dynamic and heterogeneous, it is very difficult
for an individual SBS to provide satisfactory computation service at all times. To overcome
3these difficulties, cooperation among SBSs can be exploited to enhance MEC performance
and improve the efficiency of system resource utilization via computation peer offloading. For
instance, a cluster of SBSs can coordinate among themselves to serve mobile users by offloading
computation workload from SBSs located in hot spot areas to nearby peer SBSs with light
computation workload, thereby balancing workload among the geographically distributed SBSs
(see Figure 1 for an illustration). Similar ideas have been investigated for data-center networks
to deal with spatial diversities of workload patterns, temperatures, and electricity prices. In
fact, SBS networks are more vulnerable to heterogeneous workload patterns than data center
networks which serve an aggregation of computation requests across large physical regions. Since
the serving area of each SBS is small, the workload pattern can be affected by many factors
such as location, time, and user mobility, therefore becoming very violate and easily leading to
uneven workload distribution among the SBSs. Although there have been quite a few works on
geographical load balancing in data centers, performing peer offloading in MEC-enabled small
cell networks faces unique challenges.
First, small cells are often owned and deployed by individual users. Although incentive
mechanism design, which has been widely studied in the literature for systems not limited to
small cell networks, plays an important role in incentivizing self-interested users to participate
in the collaboration of workload peer offloading, an equally, if not more, important problem
is how to maximize the value of the limited resources committed by individual SBS owners.
Second, small cells operate in a highly stochastic environment with random workload arrivals
in both temporal and spatial domains. As a result, the long-term system performance is more
relevant than the immediate performance. However, the limited energy resources committed by
the SBS owners make the peer offloading decisions across time intricately intertwined, yet the
decisions have to be made without foreseeing the far future. Third, whereas data centers manage
only the computing resources, moving the computing resources to the network edge leads to
the co-provisioning of radio access and computing services by the SBSs, thus mandating a new
model for understanding the interplay and interdependency between the management of the two
resources under energy constraints.
In this paper, we study computation peer offloading in MEC-enabled small cell networks.
Our goal is to maximize the long-term system-wide performance (i.e. minimizing latency) while
taking into account the limited energy resources committed by individual SBS owners. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
41) We develop a novel framework called OPEN (which stands for Online PEer OffloadiNg) for
performing stochastic computation peer offloading among a network of MEC-enabled SBSs in an
online fashion by leveraging the Lyapunov optimization [5]. We prove that OPEN achieves within
a bounded deviation from the optimal system performance that can be achieved by an oracle
algorithm that knows the complete future information, while bounding the potential violation of
the energy constraints imposed by individual SBS owners.
2) We theoretically characterize the optimal peer offloading strategy. We show that the peer
offloading decisions are determined by the marginal computation cost (MaCC) – a critical
quantity that captures both computation delay cost and energy cost at SBSs. The peer offloading
essentially is to evenly distribute MaCCs among SBSs. The SBSs decide their roles (to send
or receive workload) based on the pre-offloading MaCCs (i.e., MaCCs before peer offloading).
The amount of workload to be offloaded is determined based on optimal post-offloading MaCCs
(i.e., MaCCs to achieve after peer offloading) designed by OPEN.
3) We consider both the scenario in which a central entity (e.g. the network operator) collects
all current time information and coordinates the peer offloading and the scenario in which SBSs
coordinate their peer offloading strategies in a decentralized and autonomous way. For the latter
case, we formulate a novel peer offloading game, prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium
using the variational inequality technique, and characterize the efficiency loss due to the strategic
behaviors of SBSs in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA).
4) We run extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of OPEN and verify our analytical
results for various system configurations and traffic arrival patterns. The results confirm that our
method significantly improves the system performance in terms of latency reduction and energy
efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related works. Section III
presents the system model and formulates the problem. Section IV develops the OPEN framework
and presents the centralized solution for computation peer offloading. Section V formulates and
analyzes the peer offloading game. Simulations are carried out in Section VI, followed by the
conclusion in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The concept of offloading data and computation in cloud computing is used to address the
inherent problems in mobile computing by using resource providers other than the mobile device
5TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH EXISTING WORKS
Feature
Approach
[6], [7] [8]–[10] [11] [12] [13] [14], [15] OPEN (This paper)
Applied stage UE-to-ES UE-to-ES DC-to-DC DC-to-DC UE-to-DC UE-to-ES ES-to-ES
Radio access aware Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Computation aware No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
System objective Myopic Myopic Long-term Myopic Long-term Myopic Long-term
Long-term constraints No No Yes (Overall) No No No Yes (Individual)
Temporal correlation No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Strategic behavior No No No No Yes Yes Yes
UE: User equipment; DC: Data Center; ES: Edge Server
itself to host the execution of mobile applications [16]. In the most common case, mobile
cloud computing means to run an application on a resource rich cloud server located in remote
mega-scale data centers, while the mobile device acts like a thin client connecting over to the
remote server through 4G/Internet [17]. Recently, the edge computing paradigm [2] (a.k.a. fog
computing [18], cloudlet [19], micro datacenter [20]) brings computing resources closer to the
end users to enable ultra-low latency and precise location-awareness, thereby supporting a variety
of emerging mobile applications such as mobile gaming, augmented reality and autonomous
vehicles. Nevertheless, edge servers, such as MEC-enabled SBSs [21], cannot offer the same
computation and storage capacities as traditional computing servers.
Many recent works investigate SBS cooperation for improving the system performance, subject
to various constraints including local resource availability (e.g. radio resources [6], [7], com-
putational capacities [10], energy consumption budgets [22] and backhaul bandwidth capacity
[23]). However, most of these works focus on optimizing the radio access performance only
without considering the computing capability of SBSs. In [9], [10], computation load distribu-
tion among the network of SBSs is investigated by considering both radio and computational
resource constraints. Clustering algorithms are proposed to maximize users’ satisfaction ratio
while keeping the communication power consumption low. However, these works focus more
on the user-to-SBS offloading side whereas our paper studies the offloading among peer SBSs.
More importantly, these works perform myopic optimization without considering the stochastic
nature of the system whereas our paper studies a problem that is highly coupled across time due
to the long-term energy constraints.
6Computation workload peer offloading among SBSs is closely related to geographical load
balancing techniques originally proposed for data centers to deal with spatial diversities of
workload patterns [24], temperatures [25], and electricity prices [26]. Most of these works
study load balancing problems that are independent across time [27]. Very few works consider
temporally coupled problems. In [24], the temporal dependency is due to the switching costs
(turning on/off) of data center servers, which significantly differs from our considered problem.
The closest work to our paper is [11], which aims to minimize the long-term operational cost
of data centers subject to a long-term water consumption constraint. However, the long-term
constraint is imposed on the entire system whereas in our paper each SBS has an individual
energy budget constraint. Moreover, we not only provide centralized solutions for peer-offloading
but also develop schemes that enable autonomous coordination among SBSs by formulating and
studying a peer-offloading game. Several works use reinforcement learning to efficiently manage
the resource of geo-distributed data centers [28], [29]. Although the reinforcement learning can
also be a potential solution to our peer-offloading problem, there are several challenges for using
such a formulation. First, the system states are usually assumed to be Markovian, which may
not be true in real systems. Second, large state and action spaces may be needed to capture
the various system and decision variables and hence complexity and convergence is a big issue.
Third, reinforcement learning often does not capture the long-term energy constraint and may
easily violate it. By contrast, our solution is based on the Lyapunov drift-plus-penalty framework,
which can be applied to more general stochastic systems, does not need to maintain large state
and action spaces, and can handle long-term energy constraints.
The formulated peer offloading game is similar to the widely studied congestion game [30] at
the first sight. However, there is a crucial difference between these two games: a main assumption
in congestion games is that all players have the same cost function for a element; however, in the
peer offloading game, cost function of a SBS to retain workload on itself is different from that of
other SBSs to offload tasks to that SBS due to the energy consumption concern. This difference
demands for new analytical tools for understanding the peer offloading game. For instance, the
potential function technique [30] used to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the
congestion game does not apply and hence, in this paper, we prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium via the variational inequality technique [31]. Game theoretic modeling was also
applied in the MEC computation offloading context in [14] [15]. This work focuses on the
computation offloading among multiple UEs to a single BS, which is a different scenario than
7ours. Table 1 summarizes the differences of proposed strategy from existing works.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network model
We consider N SBSs (e.g. femtocells), indexed by N = {1, . . . , N}, deployed in a building
(residential or enterprise) and connected by the same Local Area Network (LAN). These SBSs
are endowed with, albeit limited, edge computing capabilities and hence, User Equipments (UEs)
can offload their computation tasks to corresponding serving SBSs via wireless communications
for processing. The computing capabilities of SBS i is characterized by its computation service
rate fi (CPU frequency), and the computation service rates of all SBSs in the network are
collected by f = {fi}i∈N . Let M = {1, . . . ,M} denote the set of all UEs in the building. Each
SBS serves a dedicated set of UEs in its serving area, denoted by Mi ⊆ M. For example,
UEs (e.g. mobile phones, laptops etc.) of employees in a business are authorized to access
the communication/computing service of the SBS deployed by the business. Notice that our
algorithm is also compatible with other network structure and association strategies as long as
the UE-SBS associations stay unchanged in one peer offloading decision cycle.
B. Workload arrival model
The operational timeline is discretized into time slots (e.g. 1 - 5 minutes) for making peer
offloading decisions, which is a much slower time scale than that of task arrivals. In each time
slot t, computation tasks originating from UE m is generated according to a Poisson process
which is a common assumption on the computation task arrival in edge systems [1]. Let πtm
denote the rate of the Poisson process for task generation at UE m in time slot t. In each time
slot, πtm is randomly drawn from π
t
m ∈ [0, πmax] to capture the temporal variation in task arrival
pattern. Let pit = {πtm}m∈M denote the task arrival pattern of all UEs in time slot t. The UEs
may request for different types of tasks which vary in input date size and required CPU cycles.
To simply the system model, we assume that the expected input data size for one task is s (in
bits) and the expected number of CPU cycles required by one task is h. The total task arrival
rate to SBS i, denoted by φti, is φ
t
i =
∑
m∈Mi
πtm. The task arrival rates to all SBSs are collected
in φt = {φti}i∈N .
8C. Transmission model
1) Transmission energy consumption: Transmissions occur on both the wireless link between
UEs and SBSs, and the wired link among SBSs. Usually the energy consumption of wireless
transmission dominates and hence we consider only the wireless part. In each time slot t, SBSs
have to serve both uplink and downlink traffic data. We assume that the uplink and downlink
transmission operate on orthogonal channels and focus on the downlink traffic since energy
consumption of SBSs is mainly due to downlink transmission. Suppose each SBS i ∈ N operates
at a fixed transmission power P di , then the achievable downlink transmission rate r
d,t
im between
UE m and SBS i is given by the Shannon capacity,
rd,tim = W log2
(
1 +
P di H
t
im
σ2
)
, (1)
where W is the channel bandwidth, H tim is the channel gain between SBS i and UE m,
and σ2 is the noise power. The downlink traffic consists of the computation result and other
communication traffic. Since the size of computation result is usually very small, we only
consider the communication traffic. Let the downlink traffic size in time slot t be wtm ∈ [0, wmax],
then the energy consumption of SBS i for wireless transmission is
E tx,ti =
∑
m∈Mi
P di w
t
m
rd,tim
. (2)
2) UE-to-SBS transmission delay: The transmission delay is incurred during UE-to-SBS
offloading where UEs send computation tasks to the SBSs through the uplink channel. Let
P um be the transmission power of UE m, then the uplink transmission rate between UE m and
SBS i, denoted by ru,tim, can be obtained similarly as in (1). Therefore, the total transmission
delay cost for UEs covered by SBS i can be calculated as
Du,ti =
∑
m∈Mi
sπtm
ru,tim
. (3)
D. SBS Peer Offloading
Since workload arrivals are often uneven among the SBSs, computation offloading between
peer SBSs can be enabled to exploit underused, otherwise wasted, computational resource to
improve the overall system efficiency. We assume that tasks can be offloaded only once: if a
task is offloaded from SBS i to SBS j, then it will be processed at SBS j and will not be offloaded
further or back to SBS i to avoid offloading loops. Let βti· = {β
t
ij}j∈N denote the offloading
9decision of SBS i in time slot t, where βtij denotes the fraction of received tasks offloaded from
SBS i to SBS j (notice that βtii is the fraction that SBS i retains). A peer offloading profile of
the whole system is therefore βt = {βti·}i∈N . We further define β
t
·i = {β
t
ji}j∈N as the inbound
tasks of SBS i, namely the tasks offloaded to SBS i from other SBSs. Clearly, the total workload
that will be processed by SBS i is ωti(β
t) ,
∑
j∈N β
t
ji. To better differentiate the two types of
workload φti and ω
t
i(β
t), we call φti the pre-offloading workload and ω
t
i(β
t) the post-offloading
workload. A profile βt is feasible if it satisfies:
1) Positivity: βtij ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ N . The offloaded workload must be non-negative.
2) Conservation:
∑N
j=1 β
t
ij = φ
t
i, ∀i ∈ N . The total offloaded workload (including the retained
workload) by each SBS must equal its pre-offloading workload.
3) Stability: ωti(β
t) ≤ fi/h, ∀i ∈ N . The post-offloading workload of each SBS must not
exceed its service rate.
Let Bt denote the set of all feasible peer offloading profile.
Since the bandwidth of the LAN is limited, peer offloading also causes additional delay due to
network congestion. We assume that the expected congestion delay depends on the total traffic
through the LAN, denoted by λt(βt) =
∑
i∈N λ
t
i(β
t), where λti(β
t) =
∑
j∈N\{i} βij = φ
t
i−β
t
ii is
the number of tasks offloaded to other SBSs from SBS i. We assume the data size of computation
tasks has a exponential distribution, then the congestion delay Dg,t is modeled as a M/M/1
queuing system [32]:
Dg,t(βt) =
τ
1− τλt(βt)
, λt <
1
τ
, (4)
where τ is the expected delay for sending and receiving s bits (i.e., expected input data size of
a computation task) over the LAN without congestion.
E. Computation model
1) Computation delay: The computation delay is due to the limited computing capability of
SBSs. UEs in the network may request different types of services, therefore the required number
of CPU cycles to process a computation task may vary across tasks. We model the distribution of
the required number of CPU cycles of individual tasks as an exponential distribution. Given the
constant processing rate, the service time of a task therefore follows an exponential distribution.
Further considering the Poisson arrival of the computation tasks, the computation delay at each
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SBS can be modeled as an M/M/1 queuing system [32] and the expected computation delay
Df,ti for one task at SBS i is:
Df,ti (β
t) =
1
µi − ωti(β
t)
, (5)
where µi = fi/h is the expected service rate with regard to the number of tasks (i.e. tasks per
second) and ωti(β
t) is the workload processed at SBS i given the peer offloading decision βt.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the computation delay and the congestion delay.
SBS i SBS j SBS k
kjE
iI i
PiiE
ijE
edge server i
LAN
ijE
kjE
traffic congestion 
O
ijE
kjE
jI jP
edge server j
ijE
iI jI kI
Computation delay (SBS i) Network congestion delay Computation delay (SBS j)
f
iD
gD
f
jD
1/W
Fig. 2. Illustration of system delay with queuing models. The figure gives a example of network with three SBSs, where SBS
i and SBS k offload workload βij and βkj to SBS j, respectively. The computation delay model for SBS k is omitted since it
is the same as that for SBS i.
2) Computation energy consumption: The computation energy consumption at SBS i is load-
dependent, denoted as Ec,ti . In this paper, we consider a linear computation energy consumption
function Ec,ti (β
t) = κ · ωti(β
t), where κ > 0 is the energy consumption for executing h (i.e.,
expected number of CPU cycles required by a computation task) CPU cycles.
F. Problem Formulation
Peer offloading relies on SBSs’ cooperative behavior in sharing their computing resources
as well as their energy costs. A large body of literature was dedicated to design incentive
mechanisms [33], [34] to encourage cooperation among self-interested SBSs (e.g. computing
capability, energy budget) to improve the social welfare. The focus of our paper is not to design
yet another incentive mechanism. Instead, we design SBS peer offloading strategies taking the
SBS committed resources as the input and hence our method can work in conjunction with any
existing incentive/cooperation mechanisms. Usually, the decision cycle of the resource scheduling
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is much longer than that of peer offloading, therefore in this paper we consider each SBS has a
predetermined long-term energy consumption constraint as a result of some incentive mechanism.
Given the system model, the total delay cost of SBS i, defined as a sum of the delays expe-
rienced by the tasks arrived at SBSs i, consists of computation delay cost, network congestion
delay cost, and UE-to-SBS transmission delay cost:
Dti(β
t) =
∑
j∈N
βtijD
f,t
j (β
t) + λtiD
g,t(βt) +Du,ti
=
∑
j∈N
βtij
µj −
∑
k∈N β
t
kj
+
τλti(β
t)
1− τ
∑
k∈N λ
t
k(β
t)
+Du,ti ,
(6)
and the energy consumption of SBS i in time slot t consists of transmission energy consumption
and computation energy consumption:
Eti(β
t) = E tx,ti + E
c,t
i (β
t) = E tx,ti + κ
∑
k∈N
βtki. (7)
The objective of network operator is to minimize the long-term system delay cost given the
energy budgets committed by individual SBSs (which are outcomes of the adopted incentive
mechanisms). Formally, the problem is
P1 min
β1,...,βT−1
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
t)
}
(8a)
s.t.
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
{
Eti (β
t)
}
≤ E¯i, ∀i ∈ N (8b)
Eti (β
t) ≤ Emax, ∀i ∈ N , ∀t (8c)
Dti(β
t) ≤ Dmax, ∀i ∈ N , ∀t (8d)
βt ∈ Bt, ∀t (8e)
Constraint (8b) is the long-term energy budget constraint for each SBS. Constraint (8c) requires
that the energy consumption of a SBS does not exceed an upper limit Emax in each time slot.
Constraint (8d) indicates that the per-slot delay of each SBS is capped by an upper limit Dmax
so that the real-time performance is guaranteed in the worst case.
The major challenge that impedes the derivation of optimal solution to P1 is the lack of future
information. Optimally solving P1 requires complete offline information (task arrivals across all
time slots) which is difficult to predict in advance, if not impossible. Moreover, the long-term
energy constraints couple the peer offloading decision across different slots: consuming more
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energy in the current slot will reduce the available energy for future use. These challenges call for
an online optimization approach that can efficiently perform peer offloading without foreseeing
the future.
IV. ONLINE SBS PEER OFFLOADING
In this section, we develop a novel framework for making online SBS peer offloading de-
cisions, called OPEN (Online SBS PEer offloadiNg) by leveraging the Lyapunov technique.
OPEN converts P1 to per-slot optimization problems solvable with only current information.
We consider both the case in which the network operator coordinates the SBS peer offloading
in a centralized way (this section) and the case in which SBSs make peer offloading decisions
among themselves in an autonomous manner (next section).
A. Lyapunov optimization based online algorithm
In the optimization problem P1, the long-term energy constraints of SBSs couple the peer
offloading decisions across times slots. To address this challenge, we leverage the Lyapunov
drift-plus-penalty technique [5] and construct a (virtual) energy deficit queue for each SBS to
guide the peer offloading decisions to follow the long-term energy constraints. We define a set
of energy deficit queues q(t) = {qi(t)}i∈N , one for each SBS, and let qi(0) = 0, ∀i ∈ N . For
each SBS i ∈ N , its energy deficit queue evolves as follows:
qi(t+ 1) = max{qi(t) + E
t
i (β
t)− E¯i, 0}, (9)
where qi(t) is the queue length in time slot t, indicating the deviation of current energy con-
sumption from the long-term energy constraint of SBS i.
Next, we present the online algorithm OPEN (Algorithm 1) for solving P1. In OPEN, the
network operator determines the peer offloading strategy in each time slot t by solving the
optimization problem P2, as presented below:
P2 min
βt∈Bt
N∑
i=1
(
V ·Dti(β
t) + qi(t) ·E
t
i (β
t)
)
s.t. (8c), (8d) and (8e)
The objective in P2 is designed based on Lyapunov drift-plus-penalty framework. The rationale
behind this design will be explained later in Section IV-C. The first term in P2 is to minimize the
13
Algorithm 1: OPEN
Input: control parameter V , energy deficit queues q(0) = 0;
Output: offloading decisions β0, . . . ,βT−1;
1 for t = 0 to T − 1 do
2 Observe workload arrival φt and feasible peer offloading strategy set Bt ;
3 Solving P2 to get optimal βt in time slot t:
min
βt∈Bt
∑
i∈N
(V ·Dti(β
t) + qi(t) · Eti (β
t)) ;
4 Update the deficit for all SBS i:
5 qi(t+ 1) = [qi(t) + E
t
i (β
t)− E¯i]+
6 end
7 return β1, . . . ,βT−1;
system delay and the second term is added aiming to satisfy the long-term energy constraint (8b)
in an online manner; the positive control parameter V is used to adjust the trade-off between these
two purposes. To give a brief explanation, by considering the additional term
∑N
i=1 qi(t)E
t
i(β
t),
the network operator takes into account the energy deficits of SBSs in current-slot decision
making: when q(t) is larger, minimizing the energy deficits is more critical for network operator.
Thus, OPEN works following the philosophy of “if violate the energy budget, then use less
energy”, and hence the long-term energy constraint can be satisfied in the long run without
foreseeing the future information. Later in this section, we will rigorously prove the performance
of OPEN in terms of system delay cost and long-term energy consumption. Now, to complete
OPEN, it remains to solve the optimization problem P2. Notice that solving P2 requires only
currently available information as input.
B. Centralized solution to OPEN
In this subsection, we consider the existence of a centralized controller who collects the
complete current-slot information from all SBSs, solves the per-slot problem P2, and coordinates
SBS peer offloading in each time slot t. Before proceeding to the solution, we rewrite the
14
objective function of P2 as below:∑
i∈N
(
V ·Dti(β
t) + qi(t) · E
t
i (β
t)
)
=
∑
i∈N
V · (
∑
j∈N
βtijD
f,t
j (β
t) + λti(β
t)Dg,t(βt) +Du,ti ) +
∑
i∈N
qi(t)(E
tx,t
i + E
c,t
i (β
t))
=
∑
j∈N
V
∑N
i=1 β
t
ij
µj −
∑N
k=1 β
t
kj
+
V τ
∑N
i=1 λ
t
i(β
t)
1− τ
∑N
k=1 λ
t
k(β
t)
+
∑
i∈N
κqi(t)ω
t
i(β
t) +
∑
i∈N
(
V Du,ti + qi(t)E
tx,t
i
)
=
∑
i∈N
V
(
V ωti(β
t)
µi − ωti(β
t)
+ κqi(t)ω
t
i(β
t)
)
+
V τλt(βt)
1− τλt(βt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decision-dependent
+
∑
i∈N
(
V Du,ti + qiE
tx,t
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
decision-independent
. (10)
The objective function of P2 can be divided into two parts: (i) a decision-dependent part which
is a weighted sum of the computation delay cost, the computation energy consumption, and the
network congestion delay cost; (ii) a decision-independent part which relates to the UE-to-SBS
transmission delay and SBS-to-UE energy consumption. Therefore, we focus on the decision-
dependent part for solving P2. Although the decision-independent part does not affect the solution
of P2 directly, its second term (i.e., E tx,t) will affect the energy deficit queue updating and hence
indirectly affects peer offloading decisions in the long-run.
Notice that P2 is solved in each time slot, for ease of exposition, we drop the time index for
variables. Moreover, instead of optimizing βt directly, we alternatively optimize the amount of
workload ωti(β) each SBS should accommodate, and the corresponding total traffic in the LAN
λt(β). By rewriting ωti(β) as ωi and λ
t(β) as λ, P2 is therefore equivalent to:
P2-S min
ωi∈Ωi,λ∈Λ
∑
i∈N
(
V ωi
µi − ωi
+ κqiωi
)
+
V τλ
1− τλ
(11a)
s.t. Ei(ωi, λ) ≤ Emax, ∀i ∈ N (11b)
Di(ωi, λ) ≤ Dmax, ∀i ∈ N (11c)
ωi ∈ Ωi, λ ∈ Λ, ∀i ∈ N (11d)
where Ωi in (11d) is the feasible space for ωi determined by the mapping ωi : B → Ωi,
and similarly Λ is determined by λ : B → Λ. Notice that, although ωis and λ are written as
independent variables, they are deterministic functions of a particular β in each time slot. To
capture the relation between ωis and λ, we introduce and closely follow a workload flow equation
when solving P2-S, which will be shown shortly.
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Next, we give the optimal solution for the above optimization problem starting with classifying
SBSs into the following three categories:
• Source SBS (R). A SBS is a source SBS if it offloads a positive portion of its pre-offloading
workloads to other SBSs and processes the rest of workloads locally. Moreover, it does not
receive any workload from other SBSs (0 ≤ ωi < φi).
• Neutral SBS (U): A SBS is a neutral SBS if it processes all its pre-offloading workloads
locally and does not receive any workload from other SBSs (ωi = φi).
• Sink SBS (S): A SBS is a sink SBS if it receives workloads from other SBSs and does
not offload workload to others (ωi > φi).
Notice that in our categorization, there is no SBS such that it offloads workloads to other
SBSs while receiving workloads from other SBSs. This is because it can be easily shown that
having such SBSs result in suboptimal solutions to P2 due to the extra network congestion delay.
To assist the presentation of the optimal solution, we define two auxiliary functions.
Definition 1. Define di(ωi) ,
∂
∂ωi
[ωiD
f
i (ωi)] =
µi
(µi−ωi)2
as the marginal computation delay
function for SBS i, ∀i ∈ N ; g(λ) , ∂
∂λ
[λDg(λ)] = τ
(1−τλ)2
as the marginal congestion delay
function.
Specifically, di(ωi) is the marginal value of the computation delay function when ωi tasks are
processed at SBS i; and g(λ) is the marginal value of the congestion delay function with s · λ
bits traffic in the LAN.
We define ξi , V di(φi)+κqi as the pre-offloadingMarginal Computation Cost (MaCC), taking
into account both the computation delay cost and the computation energy consumption if SBS
i processes all its tasks locally. Based on ξi, Theorem 1 shows the optimal SBS categorization,
workload allocation, and corresponding traffic in LAN.
Theorem 1. The category that SBS i belongs to, the optimal post-offloading workload ω∗i , and
the corresponding traffic in LAN λ∗ can be determined based on pre-offloading MaCC ξi and a
parameter α:
(a) If ξi < α, then i ∈ S and ω∗i = d
−1
i (
1
V
(α− κqi));
(b) If α ≤ ξi ≤ α + V g(λ∗), then i ∈ U and ω∗i = φi;
(c) If ξi > α + V g(λ
∗), then i ∈ R and ω∗i = [d
−1
i (
1
V
(α+ V g(λ∗)− κqi))]
+;
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where λ∗, α are the solution to the workload flow equation∑
i∈S
(
d−1i (
1
V
(α− κqi))− φi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λS : inbound workloads to sinks
=
∑
i∈R
(
φi − [d
−1
i (
1
V
(α+ V g(λ∗)− κqi))]
+
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λR: outbound workloads from sources
. (12)
Proof. See Appendix A in Supplementary File.
In Theorem 1, α is a Lagrange multiplier that equals the unique optimal post-offloadingMaCC
(i.e. V di(ω
∗
i ) + κqi) of sink SBSs. Part (a) indicates that SBSs with pre-offloading MaCC less
than α will serve as sink SBSs and their post-offloading MaCCs will be equal to α. Part (b)
implies that the pre-offloading MaCC of a neutral SBS is no less than α but no larger than the
sum of α and the marginal congestion delay cost. This means that no other SBSs would benefit
from offloading workloads to neutral SBSs and at the same time neutral SBS receive no benefits
by performing peer offloading. For a source SBS, its pre-offloading MaCC is larger than the sum
of α and the marginal congestion delay cost and therefore, it tends to offload workloads to other
SBSs until its post-offloadingMaCC reduces to α+V g(λ∗) (i.e. ω∗i = d
−1
i (V
−1(α+V g(λ∗)−κqi))
or no more workload can be further offloaded (i.e. ω∗i = 0). Figure 3 depicts the categorization
of SBSs and the difference between their pre-offloading and post-offloading MaCCs.
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Fig. 3. SBS categorization and changes in the marginal computation costs.
Since directly deriving a solution for α is impossible, we develop an iterative algorithm called
OPEN-Centralized for solving P2. OPEN-Centralized uses binary search to obtain α under the
workload flow equation, which is summarized in Algorithm 2. In each iteration, the algorithm
first determines a set of sink SBSs (S) according to the parameter α, then the corresponding
amount of inbound workload is determined. Given the total workload λ = λS transmitted in the
LAN, the algorithm determines the source SBSs (R), neutral SBSs (U) and then calculates the
outbound workload λR. If λR equals λS, then the optimal α is found; otherwise, the algorithm
updates α and goes into the next iteration.
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Algorithm 2: OPEN-Centralized
Input: SBS services rates: µ1, µ2, . . . , µN ; SBS workload arrival rates: φ1, φ2, . . . , φN ;
Network mean communication time: τ .
1 Initialization: ωi ← φi, i ∈ N ;
2 Get pre-offloading MaCC for SBSs ξi = V di(φi) + κqi;
3 Find ξmax = maxi∈N ξi and ξmin = mini∈N ξi;
4 If ξmin + V g(0) ≥ ξmax, then STOP (no peer offloading is required);
5 a← ξmin; b← ξmax;
6 while |λS(α)− λR(α)|≥ ǫ˜ do
7 λS(α)← 0, λR(α)← 0;
8 α←
1
2
(a+ b);
9 Get in order: S(α), λS(α), R(α), U(α), λR(α) ;
10 if λS(α) > λR(α) then b← α;
11 else a← α;
12 end
13 Determine ω∗i and λ
∗ based on Theorem 1;
Remark: Notice that the algorithm outputs the optimal workload allocation of SBSs, ω∗i , ∀i ∈
N and the corresponding traffic in the LAN λ∗. Any peer offloading strategy that realizes the
optimal workload allocation is an optimal peer offloading profile β∗ for P2.
C. Performance Analysis of OPEN
In this section, we rigorously prove the performance bound of OPEN. We first show that with
the designed energy deficit queue qi(t), the long-term energy constraint (8b) for each SBS is
enforced if the queues qi(t) are stable, i.e. limT→∞ E{qi(t)}/T = 0.
According to the queue update rule in (9), we have qi(t+1) ≥ qi(t)+Eti − E¯i. Summing this
over time slots t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} then dividing the sum by T , we have
qi(T )− qi(0)
T
+ E¯i ≥
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Eti(β
t). (13)
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Initializing the queue as qi(0) = 0, ∀i and letting T →∞, then taking the expectations of both
side yields
lim
T→∞
E{qi(t)}
T
+ E¯i ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{Eti (β
t)}. (14)
If the virtual queues qi(t) are stable (i.e., limT→∞ E{qi(t)}/T = 0), then (14) becomes the
long-term energy constraint (8b). In the following, it will be shown that the deficit queue qi(t)
is guaranteed to be stable by running the proposed OPEN. We start with defining a quadratic
Lyapunov function L(q(t)) as: L(q(t)) , 1
2
∑N
i=1 q
2
i (t). It represents a scalar metric of the queue
length in all virtual queues. A small value of L(q(t)) implies that all the queue backlogs are
small, which means the virtual queues have strong stability. To keep the virtual queues stable
(i.e., to enforce the energy constraints) by persistently pushing the Lyapunov function towards
a lower value, we introduce one-slot Lyapunov drift ∆(q(t)):
∆(q(t)) , E {L(q(t + 1))− L(q(t))|q(t)}
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
{
q2i (t + 1)− q
2
i (t)|q(t)
}
(†)
≤
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
{
(qi(t) + E
t
i (β
t)− E¯i)
2 − q2i (t)|q(t)
}
≤
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Emax − E¯i)
2 +
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
Eti (β
t)− E¯i|q(t)
}
.
The inequality (†) comes from (qi(t) +Eti(β
t)− E¯i)2 ≥ [max(qi(t) +Eti(β
t)− E¯i, 0)]2. By ex-
tending the Lyapunov drift to an optimization problem, our objective is to minimize a supremum
bound on the following drift-plus-penalty expression in each time slot:
∆(q(t))+V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
t)|q(t)
}
≤ V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
t)|q(t)
}
+B +
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
(Eti(β
t)− E¯i)|q(t)
}
, (15)
where B = 1
2
∑N
i=1(Emax − E¯i)
2. Notice that OPEN (Line 3 in Algorithm 1) exactly minimizes
the right hand side of (15). The parameter V ≥ 0 controls the delay-energy deficit tradeoff, i.e.,
how much we shall emphasize the delay minimization compared to the energy deficit. Next we
give a rigorous performance bound of OPEN compared to the optimal solution to P1.
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Theorem 2. Following the optimal peer offloading decision β∗,t obtained by OPEN-Centralized,
the long-term system delay cost satisfies:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
∗,t)
}
< Doptsys +
B
V
, (16)
and the long-term energy deficit of SBSs satisfies:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Eti(β
∗,t)− E¯i
}
≤
1
ǫ
(
B + V (Dmaxsys −D
opt
sys)
)
, (17)
where Doptsys = limT→∞
1
T
∑T−1
t=0
∑N
i=1 E {D
t
i(β
opt,t)} is the optimal system delay to P1, Dmaxsys =
NDmax is the largest system delay cost, and ǫ > 0 is a constant which represents the long-term
energy surplus achieved by some stationary strategy.
Proof. See Appendix B in Supplementary File.
The above theorem demonstrates an [O(1/V ), O(V )] delay-energy deficit tradeoff. OPEN
asymptotically achieves the optimal performance of the offline problem P1 by letting V →∞.
However, the optimal system delay cost is achieved at the price of a larger energy deficit, as
a larger deficit queue is required to stabilize the system and hence postpones the convergence.
The long-term energy deficit bound in (17) implies that the time-average energy deficit grows
linearly with V . Notice that the total energy consumption of the overall system stays almost
the same regardless of the peer offloading decision. This is because all computation tasks are
accommodated within the edge system and the same amount of energy will be spent to process
these tasks (assuming the energy due to wired transmission is negligible). The real issue is
where these tasks are processed and how much energy each SBS should spend given its long-
term energy constraint.
V. AUTONOMOUS SBS PEER OFFLOADING
In the previous section, the network operator coordinates SBS peer offloading in a centralized
way. However, the small cell network is often a distributed system where there is no central
authority controlling the workload allocation. Moreover, individual SBSs may not have the
complete information of the system, which impedes the derivation of social optimal solution. In
this section, we formulate OPEN as a non-cooperative game where SBSs minimize their own
costs in a decentralized and autonomous way. We analyze the existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE)
and the efficiency loss due to decentralized coordination compared to the centralized coordination
in terms of the Price of Anarchy (PoA).
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A. Game Formulation
We first define a non-cooperative game Γ , (N , {Bi·}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N ), where N is the set of
SBSs, Bi· is the set of feasible peer offloading strategies for SBS i, and Ki is the cost function
for each SBS i defined as Ki(β
t) = V · Dti(β
t) + qi(t)E
t
i (β
t). In the autonomous scenario,
each SBS aims to minimize its own cost by adjusting its own peer offloading strategy in each
time slot t. Without causing confusions, we also drop the time index t in this section. The Nash
equilibrium of this game is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium of the SBS peer offloading game defined
above is a peer offloading profile βNE = {βNEi· }i∈N such that for every SBS i ∈ N :
βNEi· ∈ argmin
β˜i·
Ki(β
NE
1· ,β
NE
2· , . . . , β˜i·, . . . ,β
NE
N ·). (18)
At the Nash equilibrium, a SBS cannot further decrease its cost by unilaterally choosing a
different peer offloading strategy when the strategies of the other SBSs are fixed. The equilibrium
peer offloading profile can be found when each SBS’s strategy is a best response to the other
SBSs’ strategies. Before proceeding with the analysis, we give an equivalent expression of Ki(β)
by considering only the part that depends on SBS i’s peer offloading strategy βi·:
Ci(βi·) = βii
(
V
µi − ωi(βi·,β−i·)
+ κqi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost due to local processing
(19)
+
∑
j∈N\{i}
βij
(
V
µj − ωj(βi·,β−i·)
+
V τ
1− τλ(βi·,β−i·)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost due to peer offloading
,
where β−i· is the peer offloading decisions of other SBSs except SBS i. The first part of (19)
is the cost incurred by processing the retained workload locally (i.e. the computation delay cost
of itself and the energy consumption) and the second part is the cost incurred by performing
peer offloading (i.e. the computation delay cost on other SBSs and the network congestion delay
cost). To facilitate our analysis, (19) can be further represented as:
Ci(βi·) =
∑
j∈N
βijcij(βi·). (20)
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where
cij(βi·) =


V
µj − ωj(βi·,β−i·)
+
V τ
1− τλ(βi·,β−i·)
, if j 6= i
V
µi − ωi(βi·,β−i·)
+ κqi, if j = i
Then, in the autonomous SBS peer offloading, the best response problem for each SBS i ∈ N
becomes:
P3 min
βi·∈Bi·
∑
j∈N
βijcij(βi·) (21a)
s.t. Ei(βi·,β−i·) ≤ Emax (21b)
Di(βi·,β−i·) ≤ Dmax (21c)
βi· ∈ Bi· (21d)
B. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the existence of Nash equilibrium in SBS peer offloading game.
First, we define the pair-specific marginal cost functions as follows:
Definition 3 (Pair-specific marginal cost). The marginal cost function of SBS i for offloading to
SBS j is defined as c˜ij(βi·) =
∂(βijcij(βi·))
∂βij
= cij(βi·) + βij
∂cij(βi·)
∂βij
.
The vector of pair-specific marginal cost functions for SBS i is collected in the notation
c˜i· = (c˜ij)j∈N . It is easy to verify that c˜i·(βi·) = ▽iCi(βi·), where ▽iCi(βi·) stands for the
gradient of Ci(βi·) with respect to βi·. The pair-specific marginal cost function for the network
is collected in the notation c˜ = (c˜i·)i∈N . Next, we establish conditions of the existence of a
Nash equilibrium via variational inequalities. To this end, we first recall a classical result which
characterizes a solution of best response problem by a variational inequality.
Lemma 1. βBRi· is the best response of SBS i in (21a) if and only if it satisfies the following
variational inequality:
〈c˜i·(β
BR
i· ),βi· − β
BR
i· 〉 ≥ 0, ∀βi· ∈ Bi·, (22)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product operator.
Proof. See Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [31] (Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2). Notice that
Ci(βi·) is required to be convex with respect to βi·, which is obvious in (20).
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The following theorem establishes the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the SBS peer
offloading game.
Theorem 3 (Existence of Nash equilibrium). The SBS peer offloading game admits at least one
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. According to Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [31] Chapter 1, Theorem 3.1, since B is
a nonempty, compact, and convex feasible offloading strategy set and c˜ as a continuous map
defined on B, there exist β′ ∈ B that satisfies the following variational inequality:
〈c˜(β′),β − β′〉 ≥ 0, ∀ β ∈ B. (23)
Next, we prove that this β′ is a Nash equilibrium. According to Lemma 1, for a best respond
βBRi· of (21a), we must have:
〈c˜i·(β
BR
i· ),βi· − β
BR
i· 〉 ≥ 0, (24)
and all βBRi· satisfying (24) is an optimal solution of (21a). It remains to show that (24) is
equivalent to (23). If (24) is true for all i, then (23) follows immediately for βBR. If (23) is
true, one can always take a specific profile β such that βk· = β
′
k· for all k 6= i to obtain
〈c˜i·(β
′
i·),βi· − β
′
i·〉 ≥ 0 for SBS i, which means β
′
i· is one of the best response solutions.
According to Definition 2, we can conclude that β′i· is a Nash equilibrium.
C. Algorithm for Achieving Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, we first present the best-response algorithm which is used to obtain βBRi·
for each SBS. Then all SBSs take turns in a round-robin fashion to perform the best-response
until an Nash equilibrium βNE is reached.
SinkSource
SBS i SBS j
0
ii
β ≥ 0ijβ >
IdleNeutral
SBS i SBS j
ii i
β ϕ= 0ijβ =
Fig. 4. Illustration of SBS categories with respect to SBS i.
Analogous to the previous section, SBSs are classified into different categories (see illustration
in Fig.4):
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• Source SBS (R). A SBS is a source SBS if it offloads a positive portion of its pre-offloading
workloads to other SBSs and processes the rest of workloads locally (0 ≤ βii < φi).
• Neutral SBS (U). A SBS is a neutral SBS if it processes all its pre-offloading workloads
locally (βii = φi).
• Idle SBS with respect to SBS i (Ii). A SBS is an idle SBS with respect to SBS i if it
does not receive any workload from SBS i (βij = 0).
• Sink SBS with respect to SBS i (Si). A SBS is a sink SBS with respect to SBS i if it
receives workload from SBS i (βij > 0).
The first two categories are defined depending on how the SBS handles its own pre-offloading
workloads. The last two categories are defined depending on how the SBS handles other SBSs’
workloads. Since there are N − 1 other SBSs, the categories are defined with respect to each
SBS. Unlike the categories in Section IV, these categories are not mutually exclusive and hence,
a SBS can belong to multiple categories at the same time.
To solve the best-response problem in (21a) for each SBS i, we define two auxiliary functions.
Definition 4. Define dij(βij) ,
∂[βijD
f
j (βij)]
∂βij
=
µij
(µij−βij)2
as the pair-specific marginal computation
delay function; gi(λi) ,
∂[λiD
g(λi)]
∂λi
= τΛ−i
(Λ−i−τλi)2
as the pair-specific marginal congestion delay
function, where µij = µj −
∑N
k=1,k 6=i βkj and Λ−i = 1− τ
∑N
k=1,k 6=i λk.
The pre-offloading Pair-specific Marginal Computation Cost (PMaCC) is therefore
ξij =

V dij(0), j 6= i
V dii(φi) + κqi, j = i
, (25)
by initializing βii = φi and βij = 0, ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i.
Theorem 4. In the SBS peer offloading game, the category that SBS i belongs to and its best
response peer offloading strategy βBRi· can be decided as follow:
For SBS i itself:
(a) If ξii > αi + V gi(λ
BR
i ), then i ∈ R andβ
BR
ii =
[
d−1ii
(
1
V
(αi + V gi(λ
BR
i )− κqi)
)]+
;
(b) If ξii ≤ αi + V gi(λBRi ), then i ∈ U and β
BR
ii = φi;
For SBS j other than i (j 6= i):
(c) If ξij > αi, then j ∈ Ii and βBRij = 0;
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(d) If ξij < αi, then j ∈ Si and β
BR
ij = d
−1
ij (
αi
V
);
where λBR, αi are the solution to workload flow equation∑
j∈Si
d−1ij (
αi
V
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λS
i
: inbound workload to Si
= 1{i ∈ R} ·
(
φi − [d
−1
ij (
1
V
(αi + V gi(λ
BR
i )− qiκ))]
+
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λR
i
: outbound workload from SBS i
.
Proof. See Appendix C in Supplementary File.
Theorem 4 can be explained in a similar way as Theorem 1. Figure 5 depicts the changes of
marginal computation costs when SBS i performs best response. One major difference is that
in the best-response algorithm, SBS i determines its sink SBSs by examining only the marginal
computation delay cost (i.e., dij), regardless of the marginal energy consumption cost (κqj) of
other SBSs. This is actually intuitive since each SBS aims to minimize its own cost rather
than the overall system cost. The solution for αi can be obtained by a binary search under the
workload flow equation (??) as designed by the best-response algorithm in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Best-response
Input: φi, V , qi(t), β−i·
Output: optimal peer offloading strategy β∗i· for SBS i
1 βij ← 0(j 6= i), βii ← φi;
2 Calculate ξij, ∀j ∈ N as in (25);
3 Find ξi,max = max
j∈N ,j 6=i
ξij; ξi,min = min
j∈N ,j 6=i
ξij;
4 If ξi,min + V gi(0) > ξii STOP (no peer offloading is required);
5 a← ξi,min;
6 b← ξi,max;
7 while |λSi (αi)− λ
R
i (αi)|≥ ǫ˜ do
8 λSi (αi)← 0, λ
R
i (αi)← 0;
9 αj ←
1
2
(a+ b);
10 Get in order: Si(αi), λ
S
i (αi), R(αi), U(αi), λ
R
i (αi), βi· according to Theorem 4;
11 if λSi (αi) > λ
R
i (αi) then b← αi;
12 else a← αi;
13 end
14 return βBRi· ;
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With the best-response algorithm, we propose the algorithm OPEN-Autonomous to obtain the
Nash equilibrium βNE, where SBSs take turns to run the best-response algorithm in a round-
robin fashion. The iteration terminates if the total cost change of SBSs is less than a sufficiently
small tolerance, in which case the SBS sends a terminating message to be propagated among
SBSs. An important question is whether such best-response based algorithm indeed converges.
There exists results about the convergence of such algorithm in the context of routing in parallel
links [35]. For our peer offloading game there exists a unique Nash equilibrium because the cost
function of the players are continuous, convex and increasing. Our simulation of in Section VI
also confirms the convergence of the best-response algorithm.
D. Price of anarchy
We now analyze the price of anarchy (PoA) of the SBS peer offloading game, which is
a measure of efficiency loss due to the strategic behavior of players. Recall that β∗ is the
centralized optimal solution that minimizes the system-wide cost in each time slot. Let BNE be
the set of Nash equilibria of SBS peer offloading game. The PoA is defined as:
PoA ,
maxβ∈BNE C(β)
C(β∗)
=
maxβ∈BNE
∑
i∈N Ci(βi·)∑
i∈N Ci(β
∗
i·)
.
In the following, we give a general bound on the PoA.
Theorem 5 (Bound of PoA). Let βNE be a Nash equilibrium and β∗ be the optimal peer
offloading profile for the per-slot problem P2. Then the PoA of the non-cooperative SBS peer
offloading game satisfies:
1 ≤ PoA ≤
1
1− ρ(c)
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Fig. 5. Changes in the marginal computation costs after best response.
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where ρ(c) , supj∈N ρ(c·j), and
ρ(c·j) , sup
β,βˆ∈B
1∑N
i=1 βijcij(βi·)
·
N∑
i=1
[
(c˜ij(βi·)− cij(βˆi·))βˆij + (cij(βi·)− c˜ij(βi·))βij
]
.
Proof. We rearrange system-wide cost C(βNE) as follows:
C(βNE)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
[(
cij(β
NE)− c˜ij(β
NE)
)
βNEij + c˜ij(β
NE)βNEij
]
(†)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
(
cij(β
NE)− c˜ij(β
NE)
)
βNEij +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
c˜ij(β
NE)βˆij
(‡)
≤
∑
j∈N
[
ρ(c·j)
∑
i∈N
βNEij cij(β
NE)
]
+ C(βˆ)
≤ ρ(c)C(βNE) + C(βˆ).
where we use variational inequality (23) to get the inequality (†) and the definition of ρ(·) to
get the inequality (‡). We finish by taking βˆ = β∗.
We further establish an upper bound on ρ(c·j), which is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Define δ(c·j) = supi,k∈N
c′ij(βi·)
c′
kj
(βk·)
and η(c·j) = supi,k∈N
ωjc
′
ij(βi·)
ckj(βk·)
, ∀βi· ∈ Bi·, ∀βk· ∈
Bk·, where c
′
ij(βi·) =
∂cij(βi·)
∂βij
. If each cij is differentiable, nonnegative, increasing, and convex,
then the following inequality holds
ρ(c·j) ≤
η(c·j)
3 +
4
δ(c·j)(N − 1)
.
Proof. The proof follows Proposition 5.5 in [36].
According to Theorem 5 and Lemma 2, we see that the bound of PoA is mainly decided by
δ(c·j) = supi,k∈N
c′ij(βi·)
c′
kj
(βk·)
, i.e., the maximal ratio of SBSs’ pair-specific marginal cost values with
respect to SBS j. A larger δ(c·j) leads to a larger ρ(c·j), consequently, a larger PoA. The δ(c·j)
grows with the heterogeneity levels in task arrival rates and computation capacity among SBSs.
For example, suppose we have a SBS with an extremely large service rate, which gives a very
large δ(c·j). Then, all other SBSs tend to offload workload to that SBS, which causes a large
congestion delay in the LAN and hence increases the PoA value. Theoretically quantifying PoA
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value is hard since it heavily depends on the task arrival pattern and system configuration. In
the simulation, we measure the PoA value in each time slot.
We have proved that for each time slot t the PoA of the peer offloading game is bounded.
Let ̺max be the maximum achievable PoA across all time slots. Then, we have:
N∑
i=1
(
V ·Dti(β
NE,t) + qi(t) · E
t
i (β
NE,t)
)
≤ ̺max
N∑
i=1
(
V ·Dti(β
∗,t) + qi(t) · E
t
i (β
∗,t)
)
. (26)
The strategic behavior of SBSs in the peer offloading game cause performance loss in both delay
and energy efficiency. The following theorem rigorously shows the performance guarantee of
OPEN-Autonomous.
Theorem 6. Following the peer offloading decision βNE,t obtained by OPEN-Autonomous, the
long-term system delay cost satisfies:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
NE,t)
}
≤ ̺maxΨ(
̺max − 1
̺max
E¯max) +
B
V
,
and the long-term energy deficit of SBSs satisfies:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Eti (β
NE,t)− E¯i
}
≤
B + V (̺maxDmaxsys −D
opt
sys)
̺maxǫ− (̺max − 1)E¯max
,
where ̺max is the largest PoA value; Ψ(̺
max−1
̺max
E¯max) is the delay performance achieved by
stationary policy L satisfying energy consumption E{Ei(βL,t) − E¯i} ≤ −
̺max−1
̺max
E¯max, where
E¯max = maxi∈N E¯i; ǫ > 0 is a constant which represents the long-term energy surplus achieved
by some stationary strategy.
Proof. See Appendix D in Supplementary File.
Theorem 6 still shows a [O(V ), O(1/V )] tradeoff between delay and energy deficit. However,
the delay performance achieved is no longer comparable with the optimal system delay Doptsys.
Instead, the bound of delay performance is defined on the stationary policies with a reduced
long-term energy constrain limT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=0 E{Ei(β
t)} ≤ E¯max/̺max. Notice that if ̺max = 1,
then Theorem 6 is identical to Theorem 2.
VI. SIMULATION
Systematic simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance of proposed algorithm under
various system settings. We assume that the edge network is deployed in a commercial complex
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where the business tenants deploy their own edge facilities (SBS and edge server) to serve their
employees. These SBSs are connected to a LAN and hence can cooperate with each other via
peer-offloading. The scale of the considered commercial complex should be large (>100,000
square feet [37]), such that multiple SBSs are likely to be deployed by different business
tenants and the collaboration among SBSs can be exploited. We simulated a 100m×100m
commercial complex (107,639 square feet) served by a set of SBSs whose locations are decided
by homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP). The main advantage of PPP is that it captures
the fact that SBSs are randomly deployed by individual owners. The density of PPP process is
set as 10−3. With this PPP density and commercial complex area, the expected number of SBSs
generated by PPP is 10 which is also the average number of business tenants in a commercial
complex within an area around 100,000 square feet [38]. Here, we assume that on average each
business tenant will deploy an SBS. In each time slot, the UEs are randomly scattered in the
network. Since the average working space of a worker is 250 square feet [39], the expected
number of users in the commercial complex is 400. Considering the variation in the occupancy
rate across the time, we assume that the number of UEs in each time slot is randomly drawn
from [200, 600]. Each UE is randomly assigned to one of its nearby SBSs. For an arbitrary
UE, its task generation follows a Poisson process with arrival rate πtm ∈ [0, 4]task/sec. The
expected number of CPU cycles for each task is h = 40M. The CPU frequency of edge server
at SBSs is fn = 3GHz. These parameters are picked to capture the fact that an edge server
can be overloaded from time to time. The expected input data size of each task is s = 0.2Mb.
Therefore, for a typical 100Mb fast Ethernet LAN, the expected transmission delay for one
task is τ = 200ms. The channel gain H tm for calculating the wireless transmission is modeled
by the indoor path-loss: L[dB] = 20 log(fTX[MHz]) + NL log(d[m]) − 28, where the values of
the parameters are listed in Table II. The wireless channel bandwidth is W = 20MHz, the
noise power is δ2 = −174dBm/Hz, the transmission power of UEs is P um = 10dBm. These
parameters are picked by following a typical wireless communication setting. Consider that the
energy consumption of one CPU cycles is 8.2nJ, the expected energy consumption for each
time at SBS n is κn = 9 × 10−5Wh and the long-term energy constraint is set as 22Wh per
hour. The performances of OPEN-Centralized (OPEN-C) and OPEN-Autonomous (OPEN-A)
are compared with three benchmarks:
• No Peer offloading (NoP): peer offloading among SBSs is not enabled in the network.
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TABLE II
SIMULATION SETUP: SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameters Value
Expected number of SBSs, N 10 (Homogeneous PPP)
Expected number of UEs, M 400
Task arrival rate from UE m, pitm [0, 4]task/sec
Expected num. of CPU cycles per-task, h 40M
CPU frequency of edge server at SBS n, fn 3GHz
Expected input data size per-task, s 0.2Mb
Transmission delay for one task in LAN, τ 200ms
Wireless transmission frequency, fTX 900MHz
Distance power loss coefficient, NL 20
Wireless channel bandwidth, W 20MHz
Noise power, δ2 -174dBm/Hz
Transmission power of UEs, Pum 10dBm
Expected energy consumption per-task, κn 9× 10
−5W·h
Long-term energy constraint, E¯n 22W·h (per hour)
Each SBS processes all the tasks received from the end users. Moreover, the long-term
constraint is not enforced since some SBSs have to exceed energy constraint to satisfy all
the tasks due to the heterogeneity in spatial task arrival.
• Delay-Optimal (D-Optimal): we apply the method in [40] where SBS peer offloading is
considered as a static load balancing problem aiming to achieve the lowest system delay
regardless of the long-term energy constraints.
• Single-Slot Constraint (SSC): Instead of following a long-term energy constraint, the
network operator poses a hard energy constraint in each time slot, i.e. Eti (β
t) ≤ E¯i, such
that the long-term energy constraint is satisfied.
A. Run-time Performance Evaluation
Figure 6 shows the long-term system performance obtained by running OPEN and we mainly
focus on two metrics: the time-average system delay cost in Figure 6(a) and the time-average
energy deficit in Figure 6(b). It can be observed that without peer offloading the edge system
bears a high delay cost and a large energy deficit, since SBSs can be easily overloaded due to
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Fig. 6. Long-term performance analysis.
spatially and temporally heterogeneous task arrival pattern. By contrast, other three schemes with
peer offloading enabled (D-Optimal, SSC, and OPEN) achieve much lower system delay cost.
Specifically, D-Optimal achieves the lowest delay cost since it is designed to minimize the delay
cost by fully utilizing the computation resource regardless of the energy constraints. Therefore,
D-Optimal incurs a large amount of energy deficit as shown in Figure 6(b). The main purpose
of OPEN is to follow the long-term energy constraint of each SBS while minimizing the system
delay. As can be observed in Figure 6(b), the time-average energy deficits of both OPEN-C and
OPEN-A coverage to zero, which means that the long-term energy constraints are satisfied by
running OPEN. Moreover, OPEN-C achieves a close-to-optimal delay cost and OPEN-A incurs
a slightly higher delay cost due to the strategic behaviors of selfish SBSs. The SSC scheme
poses an energy constraint in each time slot in order to satisfy the long-term energy constraints.
As a result, the energy deficit of SSC is zero across all the time slots. However, SSC makes the
energy scheduling less flexible and therefore does not handle well the heterogeneity of temporal
task arrival pattern and results in a large system delay cost.
B. System Dynamics
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the system delay cost and the energy consumption from the 500th
to 550th time slot, respectively. We see that the system delay cost is mainly decided by the total
task arrival rate in the network which varies across the time slots. Usually, a larger task arrival
rate will result in a higher system delay cost. Figure 8 depicts the energy consumption of one
particular SBS and the corresponding energy deficit queue in each time slot to exemplify how
the energy deficit queue works to guide the energy usage. For example, from the 530th to 535th
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time slot, the SBS uses a large amount of energy and enlarges the energy deficit. Therefore, in
the following 5 time slots, OPEN reduces the energy consumption to cut the energy deficit. In
this way, the long-term energy constraints of SBSs can be satisfied.
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Fig. 7. System dynamics (delay cost).
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C. Impact of Control Parameter V
Figure 9 shows the impact of control parameter V on the performance of OPEN. The result
presents a [O(1/V ), O(V )] trade-off between the long-term system delay cost and the long-
term energy deficit, which is consistent with our theoretical analysis. With a larger V , OPEN
emphasizes more on the system delay cost and is less concerned with the energy deficit. As V
grows to the infinity, OPEN is able to achieve the optimal delay cost. It is hard to define an
optimal value for V since a lower system delay cost is achieved at the cost of larger energy deficit.
However, it still offers a guideline for picking an appropriate V . In this particular simulation, the
network operator is recommended to choose, for example, V = 50 for two reasons: (i) OPEN
has already achieved close-to-optimal delay and little improvement is available by increasing
V ; (ii) the energy deficit is much smaller compared to the energy deficit achieving the optimal
delay.
D. Composition of System Delay
Figure 10 and Figure 11 depict the composition of system delay cost for OPEN-C and OPEN-
A, receptively. For OPEN-C, the computation delay cost takes up a large proportion of the system
delay cost and the congestion delay cost is relatively small. By contrast, the congestion delay cost
becomes the main part of the system delay cost in OPEN-A. The non-cooperative behavior of
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Fig. 9. Impact of control parameter V .
SBSs results in a large volume of traffic exchange in the LAN as SBSs tend to offload workload
to other SBSs in order to save their own energy consumption. Note that the communication
delay cost is independent of peer offloading and hence it is the same for OPEN-C and OPEN-A.
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Fig. 10. Delay cost composition of OPEN-C.
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E. Price of Anarchy
Since it is difficult to quantify theoretically the upper bound of PoA, we measure PoA values
in the simulation. Figure 12 depicts the objective value (P2) achieved by OPEN-C and OPEN-A
from the 50th time slot to the 100th time slot from a simulation run of a total of 600 time
slots. It is clearly shown that in each time slot OPEN-C achieves a strictly smaller value than
OPEN-A, which means that OPEN-C outperforms OPEN-A in every time slot. For the entire
600 time slots, the mean PoA value is 1.54 and the maximum PoA value is 2.42.
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F. System Heterogeneity
Figure 13 shows the impact of heterogeneity on the performance of OPEN. In particular, the
heterogeneity of spatial task arrival pattern is considered: we regularly split the entire network
into 4 × 4 grids and define an expected task arrival rate πgridi ∼ N (10, σ
2
s), i = 1, 2, . . . , 16 for
each grid which is drawn from a normal distribution with σs being the standard deviation. The
task arrival rate of UE m is set as πgridi if UE m belongs to grid i. The level of heterogeneity is
varied by changing the standard deviation σs, which is normalized with respect to a maximum
value σs,max as σs/σs,max. The result in Figure 13 shows that for both OPEN-C and OPEN-A, a
better system performance in terms of reduced delay cost is achieved with a higher heterogeneity
level. This is because (some) SBSs are more likely to be overloaded with a higher heterogeneity
level and therefore OPEN can better help to reduce the system delay by balancing the workload.
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Fig. 13. Impact of system heterogeneity.
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G. Time Complexity
Since it also takes time for OPEN to derive peer offloading decisions, especially for OPEN-A,
we measured the runtime of OPEN on a typical PC to see its practical overhead. The simulation
is run on a DELL PRECISION T3600 workstation with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU 2.8GHz and
the results are presented in TABLE III. OPEN-C incurs an extremely low overhead, taking only
0.83ms on average (with standard deviation 0.57ms) to derive solution. By contrast, OPEN-A
needs much longer time, namely 28.1ms, to obtain the Nash equilibrium since the SBSs have
to take turns to run the best-response algorithm. However, the runtime for both OPEN-C and
OPEN-A is negligible compared to the 1-minute peer offloading decision cycle (i.e. duration of
one time slot). In addition, the information exchange is necessary to run OPEN: for OPEN-C, the
centralized controller collects the information from each SBS at the beginning of each decision
cycle; for OPEN-A, SBSs need to exchange the peer offloading decisions immediately after
executing the best-response algorithm. TABLE III also shows the estimation of delay incurred
by information exchange. Assume the bandwidth of the LAN is 20Mbps and the size of a
message packet is 800 Bytes, the delays of information exchange incurred by OPEN-C and
OPEN-A are approximately 0.2ms and 8ms, which are also negligible compared to the peer
offloading decision cycle.
TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM RUNTIME
Algorithm OPEN-C OPEN-A
Algorithm runtime 0.83 ± 0.57 ms 28.1 ± 4.84 ms
Information exchange ≈ 0.2 ms ≈ 8 ms
Computation delay (per task) 1.25 ± 0.38 sec 2.07 ± 0.65 sec
Peer offloading decision cycle 1 min 1 min
H. Impact of task arrival realization
Notice that the task arrival pattern in the real-world system may not follow the assumed
Poisson process. To analyze the practicality of OPEN, we implement it with different task
arrival realizations. Fig. 14 shows the performances achieved by OPEN and NoP with two task
arrival realizations: bursty arrival and non-i.i.d. arrival. We can see from Fig.14(a) that OPEN
and NoP both have a higher delay cost in the bursty arrival case compared to that in the Poisson
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arrival case. This is because the tasks are more likely to queue up at edge servers when bursts
occur. However, we see that the proposed algorithm still provides a 55.0% delay reduction with
bursty arrival which is similar to that of Poisson arrival. In the non-i.i.d. case, we use a Markov
process to model a task arrival pattern where the intervals of task arrivals are determined by
certain transition probabilities. We see from Fig. 14(b) that the delay reduction achieved by OPEN
in the non-i.i.d case slightly decreases compared to that in the Poisson arrival case. However,
applying OPEN still offers an obvious delay reduction, 37.5%, for the edge system. These two
examples indicate that the proposed algorithm can offer considerable performance improvement
for the edge system even if the real task arrival does not closely follow the Poisson process.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated peer offloading schemes in MEC-enabled small cell networks
where heterogeneous task arrival pattern in both spatial and temporal domains is considered.
We developed OPEN, a novel online peer offloading framework to optimize the edge computing
performance under limited energy resources committed by individual SBSs without requiring
information on future system dynamics. The proposed framework allows both centralized and
autonomous decision making, and provide provable performance guarantee. We also showed
that OPEN incurs acceptable overhead in practice. However, there are still issues that need to be
addressed. In the current system model, we considered a simple structure of LAN to model the
congestion delay during peer offloading. How to extend our analysis to more sophisticated and
practical congestion scenarios needs further investigation. Moreover, the performance guarantee
of OPEN rests on the assumption that the observations of task arrival rates in the current slot
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are precise, which may not hold for all network systems. Therefore, future efforts are needed to
take into consideration of imprecise estimation of task arrival.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let ui and vi denote the inbound and outbound traffic of SBS i, respectively. From the balance
of total traffic in the network, we have
∑N
i=1 ui =
∑N
i=1 vi. The post-offloading workload ωi
at SBS i can then be written as ωi = φi + ui − vi and the network traffic λ can be written as
λ =
∑N
i=1 vi. Hence the problem becomes:
minF (u, v) =
N∑
i=1
V [
φi + ui − vi
µi − (φi + ui − vi)
+ κqi(φi + ui − vi)] +
τ
∑N
i=1 vi
1− τ
∑N
i=1 vi
(27a)
s.t. ωi = φi + ui − vi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (27b)
−
N∑
i=1
ui +
N∑
i=1
vi = 0 (27c)
ui ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (27d)
vi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (27e)
The objective function in (27a) is convex and the constraints are all linear and define a convex
ployhedron. This imply that the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient
for optimality. Let α, δi ≤ 0, ηi ≤ 0, ψi ≤ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian is
F (u, v)+α(−
N∑
i=1
ui +
N∑
i=1
vi) +
N∑
i=1
δi(φi + ui − vi) +
N∑
i=1
ηiui +
N∑
i=1
ψivi
The optimal solution satisfies the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
∂L
∂ui
= V di(φi + ui − vi) + κqi − α+ δi + ηi = 0, ∀i ∈ N (28a)
∂L
∂vi
= −V (di(φi + ui − vi) + κqi) + V g(λ) + α− δi + ψi = 0, ∀i ∈ N (28b)
∂L
∂α
= −
N∑
i=1
ui +
N∑
i=1
vi = 0 (28c)
φi + ui − vi ≥ 0, δi(φi + ui − vi) = 0, δ ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N (28d)
ui ≥ 0, ηiui = 0, ηi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N (28e)
vi ≥ 0, ψivi = 0, ψi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N (28f)
In the following, we find an equivalent form of above equations in terms of ωi. Adding (28a)
and (28b) we have −V g(λ) = ηi + ψi, ∀i ∈ N . Since g > 0, either ηi < 0 or ψi < 0 (or both).
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Hence, from (28e) and (28f), for each i, either ui = 0 or vi = 0 (or both). We consider each
case separately.
• Case I: ui = 0, vi = 0, then we have ωi = φi. It follows from (28d) that δi = 0. Substituting
this into (28a) and (28b) gives
V di(ωi) + κqi = α− ηi ≥ α
V di(ωi) + κqi = V g(λ) + α + ψi < α + g(λ)
From the above, we have
α ≤ V di(ωi) + κqi ≤ α + V g(λ) (29)
This case corresponds to the neutral SBS.
• Case II: ui = 0, vi > 0. This case corresponds to source SBS. From (28f) we have ψi = 0 and
consider the following two subcases:
– Case II.1: vi < φi. Then, we have 0 < ωi < φi. It follows from (28d) that δi = 0. Substituting
this in to (28a),(28b) gives
V di(ωi) + κqi = α− ηi ≥ α (30)
V di(ωi) + κqi = α + V g(λ) (31)
– Case II.2: vi = φi. Then, we have ωi = 0 and (28a), (28b) gives
V di(ωi) + κqi = α− δi − ηi ≥ α
V di(ωi) + κqi = α + V g(λ)− δi ≥ α+ g(λ).
Thus, we have V di(ωi) + κqi ≥ α + V g(λ).
• Case III: ui > 0, vi = 0. Then, we have ωi > φi. It follows from (28d) and (28e) that δi = 0
and ηi = 0. Substituting this in to (28a), we have
V di(ωi) + κqi = α. (32)
This case corresponds to sink SBS.
Using (31) and (32), we have the total flow constraint:∑
i∈S
(d−1i
(
1
V
(α− κqi)
)
− φi) =
∑
i∈R
(φi − [d
−1
i
(
1
V
(α + V g(λ)− κqi)
)
]+)
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove the time-averaged system delay bound, we first introduce the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. For an arbitrary δ > 0, there exists a stationary and randomized policy Π for P2,
which decides βΠ,t independent of the current queue backlogs, such that the following inequalities
are satisfied:
N∑
i=1
E{Di(β
Π,t)} ≤ Doptsys + δ
E{Eti (β
Π,t)− E¯i} ≤ δ
Proof. The proof can be obtained by Theorem 4.5 in [5], which is omitted for brevity.
Recall that the OPEN-Centralized seeks to choose strategies β∗,t that can minimize P2 among
feasible decisions including the policy in Lemma 3 in each time slot. By applying Lemma 3 in
to the drift-plus-penalty inequality (15), we obtain:
∆(q(t)) + V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
∗,t)|q(t)
}
≤ B +
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
(Eti (β
Π,t)− E¯i)|q(t)
}
+ V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
Π,t)|q(t)
}
(†)
≤ B + δ
N∑
i=1
qi(t) + V (D
opt
sys + δ)
(33)
The inequality (†) is because that the policy Π is independent of the energy deficit queue. By
letting δ go to zero, summing the inequality over t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and then dividing the
result by T , we have:
1
T
E{L(q(t))− L(q(0))}+
V
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
∗,t)
}
≤ B + V Doptsys (34)
Rearranging the terms and considering the fact that L(q(t)) ≥ 0 and L(q(0)) = 0 yields the
bound for long-term system delay cost.
To obtain the long-term energy deficit bound, we make following assumption: there are values
ǫ > 0 and Ψ(ǫ) and an policy βL,t that satisfies:
N∑
i=1
E{Di(β
L,t)} = Ψ(ǫ)
E{Ei(β
L,t)− E¯i} ≤ −ǫ
(35)
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Plugging above into inequality (15)
∆(q(t)) + V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
∗,t)
}
≤ B + VΨ(ǫ)− ǫ
N∑
i=1
qi(t)
Summing the above over t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and rearranging terms as usual yields:
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E{qi(t)}
≤
B + V (Ψ(ǫ)−
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E {Dti(β
∗,t)}
ǫ
≤
B + V (Dmaxsys −D
opt
sys)
ǫ
(36)
Considering
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E{qi(t)} ≥
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E{Ei(βt)−E¯i} yields the long-term energy deficit bound.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. We first restate the problem introducing the variables uij and vij , where uij denotes SBS
i’s workloads into SBS j and vij denotes SBS i’s workloads out of SBS j. Given our system
model, we only have vij 6= 0 when i = j.
From the balance of the of the total traffic of SBS i in the network, we have λi =
∑N
j=1 uij =
vii. The workload βij offloaded from SBS i to SBS j can be written as
βij =

uij, if j 6= i
φi − vii, if j = i
(37)
which can be rewritten as:
βij = φij + uij − vij where φij =

φi, if j = i
0, if j 6= i
(38)
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Using above equations, the P3 becomes
min
ui·,vi·
Ci(ui·, vi·) =
N∑
j=1
[
V (φij + uij − vij)
µij − (φij + uij − vij)
+
V
∑N
j=1 vij
g−i − τ
∑N
j=1 vij
] + κqi(φi −
N∑
j=1
vij) (39a)
s.t. −
N∑
j=1
uij +
N∑
j=1
vij = 0 (39b)
φij + uij − vij ≥ 0 (39c)
uij ≥ 0 (39d)
vij ≥ 0 (39e)
Let αi, δj ≤ 0, ψj ≤ 0, ηj ≤ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian is
L(ui·, vi·, αi, δ,ψ,η) = Ci(ui·, vi·) + αi(
N∑
j=1
vij −
N∑
j=1
uij)
+
N∑
j=1
δj(uij − vij + φij) +
N∑
j=1
ψjuij +
N∑
j=1
ηjvij (40)
The optimal solution satisfies the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
∂L
∂uij
= V dij(φij + uij − vij)− αi + δj + ψj = 0 (41a)
∂L
∂vij
= −V dij(φij + uij − vij) + V gi(λ)− qiκ+ αi − δj + ηj = 0 (41b)
∂L
∂αi
= −
N∑
j=1
uij +
N∑
j=1
vij = 0 (41c)
φij + uij − vij ≥ 0, δj(φij + uij − vij) = 0, δj < 0 (41d)
uij ≥ 0, ψjuij = 0, ψj < 0 (41e)
vij ≥ 0, ηjvij = 0, ηj < 0 (41f)
Next, we find an equivalent form of (41a) - (41f) in terms of βi. We consider two case:
• Case I: φij + uij − vij = 0. We have βij = 0
– Case I.1: j 6= i. We have φij = 0 and vij = 0, it follows that uij = 0. From (41a), we
have V dij(βij) = αi − δj − ψj , which means V dij(βij) > αi. This corresponds to idle
SBS.
– Case I.2: j = i. We have φii = φi, it follows that vii = φi, (41f) implies ηi = 0.
From (41b), we have V dii(βii) = αi + V gi(λ) − κqi − δj . Then from (41c), we get
V dii(βi) + κqi > αi + V gi(λ). This corresponds to source SBS.
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• Case II: φij + uij − vij > 0. From (41c), we have δj = 0
– Case II.1: vij > 0, we must have j = i. From (41f), we have ηj = 0. (41b) implies
V dii(βii) + κqi = αi + V gi(λ). This case corresponds to source SBS.
– Case II.2: vij = 0.
∗ Case II.2.1: uij = 0. For i 6= j, it is equivalent to Case I.1. We consider j = i. Then
βii = φi. From (41b) and (41e), we have V dii(βii) + κqi < αi + V gi(λ). This case
corresponds to the neutral SBS.
∗ Case II.2.2: uij > 0, we must have j 6= i. Then βij > φij = 0. From (41e), we have
ψj = 0. Substituting this in (41a), we have V dij(βij) = αi. This case corresponds to
sink SBS for SBS i.
Equation (41c) may be written in terms of βij as∑
j∈Si
d−1ij (
αi
V
) =
∑
i∈R
(
φi − [d
−1
ij (
1
V
(αi + V gi(λ)− qiκ))]
+
)
where αi is the Lagrange multiplier.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem 2. We reuse the assumption in (35).
Given the drift-plus-cost bound in (15) and the PoA bound in (26), we have
∆(q(t)) + V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
NE,t)|q(t)
}
≤ B +
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
(Eti (β
NE,t)− E¯i)|q(t)
}
+ V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
NE,t)|q(t)
}
≤ B +
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
(̺maxEti (β
∗,t)− E¯i)|q(t)
}
+ ̺maxV
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
∗,t)|q(t)
}
≤ B +
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
(̺maxEti (β
L,t)− ̺maxE¯i)|q(t)
}
+
N∑
i=1
qi(t)E
{
(̺max − 1)E¯i)|q(t)
}
+ ̺maxV
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
L,t)|q(t)
}
≤ B +
(
(̺max − 1)E¯max − ̺maxǫ
) N∑
i=1
qi(t) + ̺
maxVΨ(ǫ)
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Letting ǫ = ̺
max−1
̺max
E¯max in (35), we have
∆(q(t)) + V
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
NE,t)|q(t)
}
≤ B + ̺maxVΨ(
̺max − 1
̺max
E¯max)
Summing the inequality over t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and then dividing the result by T , we have:
1
T
E{L(q(t))− L(q(0))}+
V
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
NE,t)
}
≤ B + ̺maxVΨ(
̺max − 1
̺max
E¯max) (42)
Rearranging the terms and considering the fact that L(q(t)) ≥ 0 and L(q(0)) = 0 yields the
bound for the long-term system delay cost for OPEN-Autonomous.
To obtain the long-term energy-deficit bound for OPEN-Autonomous, we directly sum (42)
over t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} and rearrange terms:
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E{qi(t)}
≤
1
̺maxǫ− (̺max − 1)E¯max
·(
B + V (̺maxΨ˜(ǫ)−
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
{
Dti(β
NE,t)
})
≤
1
̺maxǫ− (̺max − 1)E¯max
(
B + V (̺maxDmaxsys −D
opt
sys)
)
Considering
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E{qi(t)} ≥
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E{Ei(βNE,t)− E¯i} yields the energy deficit bound.
